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The Utility and Limits of Canons of Construction
in Public International Law
By Sean D. Murphy
Manatt/Ahn Professor of International Law
George Washington University

Forthcoming as Chapter 2 in
BETWEEN THE LINES OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION: CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION AND
OTHER INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: A PRACTITIONERS’
HANDBOOK (Joseph Klingler, Yuri Parkhomenko, and Constantinos Salonidis, eds.) (Wolters
Kluwer)
I.

Introduction

Controversy over the utility and limits of canons of legal interpretation (or construction)
has bedeviled the field of jurisprudence since ancient times, when such canons first emerged.1
Recapitulating that intellectual history falls well outside the scope of this chapter, but
recognizing its existence highlights a simple point: the utility of canons of construction when
interpreting legal text, including with respect to treaties, is not a new topic. Indeed, it has deepseated jurisprudential strands that date back centuries.
This chapter explores the utility and limits of canons of construction. While the canons of
construction are relevant to any decision-maker or observer in the field of international law
seeking to interpret a treaty, this chapter will focus on the utility and limits of such canons in the
context of international adjudication; that is, their utility and limits for litigators and judges.
Further, in exploring utility and limits, this chapter will focus on lessons that might be learned
from jurisprudential developments in U.S. law over the past century concerning the use of
canons of construction when interpreting U.S. statutes. In doing so, the chapter draws upon
developments relating to several schools of American jurisprudence, beginning with legal
formalism.
II.

Utility and Limits: Legal Formalism

Legal formalism in American jurisprudence is commonly understood as maintaining that
adjudication entails the application of clear, consistent and comprehensive legal rules to a set of
1

For an intellectual history of the canons of construction from ancient times to the present, see DAVID J. BEDERMAN,
CLASSICAL CANONS: RHETORIC, CLASSICISM AND TREATY INTERPRETATION (2001).

2
facts.2 According to the formalist, these rules have an underlying and straightforward logic; with
hard work, litigators and judges – like scientists in their domain – can discover and apply the
proper rule in any given case to reach the correct outcome. Indeed, by studying carefully such
rules and principles, a single and determinate system can be revealed, allowing an almost
mechanical application of the law to facts (“almost” because a particular rule may have a certain
porosity or “open texture” to its meaning; even then, the system provides determinate guidance).
Under this theory, the canons of construction constitute neutral rules. If a canon is
properly identified and applied in any given case, it assists the decision-maker in reaching the
correct conclusion. The canon’s utility lies in its ability to distill, in a simple formula, a piece of
logic or wisdom, one that is universally true and that forms a part of the fabric of the
international legal system. Much as the transitive property of equality (if A = B and B = C then
A = C) guides the mathematician or physicist, the legal canons of construction guide the litigator
and judge in reaching a correct result.
Though initially developed in a context other than international law, these canons were
known to and used by early writers on international law. Indeed, Grotius drew upon Greek and
Roman jurisprudence to develop detailed canons of interpretation,3 which were later developed
further by Samuel Pufendorf,4 and the positivists who succeeded them, notably Emmerich de
Vattel.5 Such writers, in turn, heavily influenced Sir Robert Phillimore’s important mideighteenth-century treatise,6 which closely analyzed the subject of treaty interpretation and
expounded on detailed canons of construction, serving as a key foil for subsequent treatises on
the law of treaties.7
As was the case in national legal systems, when international arbitral tribunals and then
courts began to emerge in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, they often invoked
canons of construction in the course of deciding cases. When doing so, they seemed to view the
canons and other general principles as automatically and neutrally allowing the case to reach the
“correct” result.8 Today most international lawyers approach international law like that of the
For legal formalism in American jurisprudence, see generally T. C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 PITTSBURGH
L. REV. 3 (1983); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 511, 539 (1988); Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism
and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111 (2010).
3
See 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS ch. 16 (F.W. Kelsey trans. 1925).
4
5 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS ch. XII (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans.
1934).
5
2 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 263 (Charles G. Fenwich trans. 1916).
6
See SIR ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW (T. & J.W. Johnson, 1854).
7
Charles Cheney Hyde, Concerning the Interpretation of Treaties, 3 AM. J. INT’L L. (1909); TSUNE-CHI YÜ, THE
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES (1927); L. Ehrlich, L’Interprétation des Traités, 24 RECUEIL DES COURS 5 (1928);
Charles Fairman, The Interpretation of Treaties, 20 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 123 (1935); Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Laws and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation
and Other Treaty Points, 1951-1954, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 203 (1957); LORD ARNOLD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF
TREATIES (1961); V.D. DEGAN, L’INTERPRÉTATION DES ACCORDS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1963).
8
See, e.g., Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Company, Ltd. v. United States, 6 R.I.A.A. 112,
114-15 (Nov. 9, 1923) (“International law, as well as domestic law, may not contain, and generally does not contain,
express rules decisive of particular cases; but the function of jurisprudence is to resolve the conflict of opposing
rights and interests by applying, in default of any specific provision of law, the corollaries of general principles, and
so to find—exactly as in the mathematical sciences—the solution of the problem.”).
2
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legal formalists, an approach that might be referred to as a “rule” approach.9 Such lawyers may
be tempted to invoke a canon of construction as though it is a straightforward, useful, and tested
means of conveying a universal rule that should be automatically applied to the case at hand. For
the litigator, it may help win the case; for the judge, it may help convince the parties and others
that the case was decided correctly. Yet many international lawyers seem aware that approaching
canons of construction as neutral rules that may be applied automatically to resolve cases is
problematic, an insight that was gleaned in American jurisprudence during the rise of the legal
realism movement.
III.

Utility and Limits: Legal Realism

The American legal realism movement, a form of analytical jurisprudence, emerged in
the early twentieth century and rejected the core tenets of legal formalism.10 With respect to
adjudication, the realists doubted that judges were mechanically applying neutral rules to decide
cases; while they might present a façade of doing so, in fact judges were at times deciding cases
based on their own political, cultural, or moral preferences.
In this context, a famous critique of canons of construction in relation to the
interpretation of statutes11 was made in 1950 by Columbia University Professor Karl N.
Llewellyn. For Llewellyn, litigators and judges in U.S. courts approached adjudication as though
there was a single correct outcome, often invoking a canon of construction. Yet he noted that
there typically could be found two opposing canons on almost every issue, which meant that
such canons were not determinate and could be used by judges to justify outcomes that were
driven by something other than neutral application of the “law”.12 In support of his observation,
Llewellyn extracted from U.S. cases a list of 24 canons that had been used (placed in a “thrust”
column), which he then paired with a list of 24 opposite canons that also had been used (placed
in a “parry” column).13 For each pairing, the outcome in a case could depend simply on which
canon a judge selected, rather than a mechanical application of the law.
A similar exercise might be undertaken with respect to canons of construction used for
the interpretation of treaties (or unilateral declarations or reservations to treaties) in international
law,14 setting forth examples such as the following:

9

See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT
160-67 (1989).
10
See generally AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas A. Reed eds.,
1993); Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915 (2005). The
movement, of course, was not unique to the United States. See, e.g., Geoffrey MacCormack, Scandinavian Realism,
11 JURID. REV. 33 (1970).
11
Similar critiques exist with respect to the use of canons of construction in U.S. law for interpreting contracts. See,
e.g., Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1964).
12
Karl N. Llewelyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are
to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
13
Id. at 401-06.
14
This table draws upon the form of Latin expression, translation and explanations provided in AARON X.
FELLMETH & MAURICE HORWITZ, GUIDE TO LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009).
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Thrust
1. In dubio haec legis construction quam verba
ostendunt (when in doubt, the construction of the
law is the one that the words indicate): when the
meaning or intent of a treaty is uncertain, the words
should be read according to their plain meaning

2. Ex abundante cautela (from an abundance of
caution): a seemingly redundant word may be
explained as simply an excess of caution by the
drafter

3. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express
statement of one is the exclusion of the other): when
something is stated expressly in the treaty, any
similar matter omitted from the treaty is presumed
to have been omitted intentionally

4. Generalis regula generaliter est intelligenda (a
general rule is to be interpreted generally): a treaty
rule of general application should be applied
broadly, with the understanding that some
exceptions may be justified
5. Contra proferentem (against the offeror):
Ambiguity or vagueness in the legal instrument
should be construed against the interests of the
drafter

6. Contemporanea expositio est optima et
fortissimo in lege (a contemporaneous exposition is
the best and strongest in the law): evidence of the
intent of the drafters of the treaty at the time of its
adoption is the best evidence as to the meaning of
vague, ambiguous or disputed language
7. In dubio mitius (more leniently in case of doubt):
where there is doubt about the existence of a treaty
obligation, no obligation will be found to avoid
limiting State sovereignty

Parry
1. In conventionibus, contrahentium voluntas
potius quam verba spectari placuit (in
agreements, the intentions of the parties are to
be regarded more than their words): the
language of a treaty that seems to disserve the
intentions of the drafters should be read to
conform to those intentions
2. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat (so that the
matter may flourish rather than perish) (also
known as “effect utile”): an interpreter should
avoid reading the treaty in a manner that would
render language in the treaty redundant, void or
ineffective
3. Exempla illustrant, nonrestringant, legem
(examples illustrate the law, they do not restrict
it): in interpreting a treaty containing examples,
the examples should be read to clarify the
purpose and scope of the treaty, rather than to
restrict its applicability only to those scenarios
depicted by the examples
4. Generalia specialibus non derogant (general
things do not derogate from specific things):
specific or detailed provisions of a treaty should
prevail over more general, conflicting
provisions
5. In ambiguous orationibus maxime sentential
spectanda est eius qui eas protulisset (in
ambiguous statements, the greatest regard is for
the views of the person who made them): when
interpreting an ambiguous treaty provision, the
opinion of the drafter on its interpretation
should carry the greatest weight
6. Principle of evolutive treaty interpretation:
generic terms in long-term treaties are
presumably intended to be interpreted
evolutively, so as to change in meaning, even in
ways not foreseen by the drafters
7. Benignius leges interpretandae sunt quo
voluntas earum conserveture (laws are to be
liberally interpreted to preserve their intent)

Although Llewellyn directly challenged the ability of canons of construction to operate in
a neutral way for deciding the outcome of a case, Llewellyn himself did not advise lawyers to
ignore such canons completely. Rather, he accepted that when “it comes to presenting a proposed
construction in court, there is an accepted conventional vocabulary,” which included the canons,
and he believed that every “lawyer must be familiar with them all; they are still needed tools of
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argument.”15 Indeed, at their heart, such canons were shorthand for expressing a complex logical
claim. For Llewellyn, canons of construction were tools of the trade; while they should not be
mistaken to be trump cards that will invariably win a case, they still had a purpose. He said:
Plainly, to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the construction contended
for must be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the canon: The good sense of
the situation and a simple construction of the available language to achieve that sense, by
tenable means, out of the statutory language.16
Even so, Llewellyn’s devastating critique “largely persuaded two generations of [U.S.]
academics that the canons of construction were not to be taken seriously.”17 Instead, U.S.
academics (and to a certain extent the courts themselves) moved toward resolution of textual
ambiguity in a statute by other means, notably through ascertaining the legislature’s intent or
purpose, to be gleaned in large part from the legislative history of the statute.
A comparable phenomenon has unfolded in international law despite the considerable use
of canons of construction by international courts and tribunals. In 1935, Manley O. Hudson’s
project on Harvard Research in International Law published a Draft Convention on the Law of
Treaties,18 which proposed an article on interpretation of treaties that did not include the many
canons of construction articulated by prior scholars.19 Rather, the commentary inveighed
strongly against the use of detailed canons of construction, at least if used as neutral, obligatory
rules. Among other things, the commentary stated that it “seems evident that the prescription in
advance of hard and fast rules of interpretation—even … if they amount only to rebuttable
presumptions—contains an element of danger which is to be avoided.”20 While not going so far
as to say “that all the so-called canons of interpretation are of absolutely no utility,” the
commentary viewed treaty interpretation not as beholden to such canons, but as “a task which
calls for investigation, weighing of evidence, judgment, foresight, and a nice appreciation of a
number of factors varying from case to case.”21
Such thinking influenced the views of later scholars, such as Julius Stone22 and Lord
McNair. Indeed, McNair would state in his important 1961 treatise that “we are amongst those
who are skeptical as to the value of those so-called rules and are sympathetic to the process of
their gradual devaluation, of which indications exist.”23 James Brierly and Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht, who served as the first two rapporteurs for the International Law Commission’s
15

Llewellyn, supra note 12, at 401.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
17
John F. Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 283, 283 (2002).
18
Research in International Law, Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT’L. L.
SUPP. 653 (1935).
19
Id. at 937, Art. 19; see also RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 64 (2d ed. 2015) (“[A]lthough listing
twelve from the many publicists who have drawn up sets of canons, rules or maxims from Grotius (1625) to Ehrlich
(1928), and noting the use made of these by arbitral tribunals and the PCIJ, despite all this volume of doctrine, the
commentary to the Harvard draft saw the modern trend as being to reduce rather than expand the number of rules.”).
20
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 18, at 946.
21
Id. at 946-47.
22
Julius Stone, Fictional Elements in Treaty Interpretation—A Study in the International Judicial Process, 1
SYDNEY L. REV. 344, 364 (1955).
23
Lord McNair, supra note 7, at 366.
16
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(ILC) project on the law of treaties, also expressed skepticism about the canons of construction
as “rules” of international law for interpreting treaties.24
By contrast, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, who served as the ILC’s third special rapporteur,
recognized the problem, but in a 1957 article25 sought to differentiate between general
“principles” of treaty interpretation, which had an obligatory character and which could be
codified, from other non-obligatory canons of construction. The same approach had been taken
by the Institute of International Law in 1956.26 The ILC’s fourth and final special rapporteur on
the topic, Sir Humphrey Waldock, also acknowledged the difficulty of imposing detailed rules
on the interpretive process and cited, inter alia, to the Harvard commentary to make that point.27
Even so, he found that not only are the “great majority of cases submitted to international
adjudication involves the interpretation of treaties,” but that “the jurisprudence of international
tribunals is rich in references to principles and maxims of interpretation.” 28 Indeed, he
maintained that “statements can be found in the decisions of international tribunals to support the
use of almost every principle or maxim of which use is made in national systems of law in the
interpretation of statutes and contracts …”.29
In light of this assessment, Waldock proposed that the Commission “seek to isolate and
to codify the comparatively few rules which appear to be “obligatory” for the interpretation of
treaties.”30 Thus, a rule that calls for the interpretation of a treaty provision to begin with its
literal words, and to give those words their usual or ordinary meaning, is obligatory in nature, as
are others, such as those that call for construing the provision in context and in light of the
treaty’s object and purpose. But other “maxims and principles” (i.e., canons of construction),
which possess a “non-obligatory character”31, should not be codified “as there would be a danger
that the inadvertent omission of a principle from the list might be thought to throw doubt upon its
status even as a subsidiary aid to the interpretation of treaties.”32
Consequently, as discussed in chapter 1 of this volume, Waldock proposed and the ILC
codified certain general canons of construction in what became Articles 31-32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties,33 drawing in particular upon the 1956 resolution of the
Institute of International Law and Fitzmaurice’s 1957 article.34 These “canons”, however,

See Hersch Lauterpacht, Interprétation de l’traits: Rapport à l’Institut de droit international, 43(I) ANNUAIRE DE
336, 336-74 (1950); J.L. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 325 (6th ed. 1963).
25
Fitzmaurice, supra note 7.
26
Institut de Droit International, Interprétation de Traités (April 19, 1956).
27
Third Report on the Law of Treaties (Sir Humphrey Waldock, special rapporteur), [1964] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
53, para. (1).
28
Id. at 54, para. (5).
29
Id.
30
Id., para. (8).
31
Id., para. (6).
32
Id., para. (8).
33
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
34
Third Report on the Law of Treaties (Sir Humphrey Waldock, special rapporteur), supra note 27, at 55-56, paras.
(10)-(12).
24
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operate at a very general level, and may be understood as mediating without favoritism35 among
the three main schools of treaty interpretation: the “textual” approach; the “intention of the
parties” approach; and the “object and purpose” approach.
What the ILC did not do was to go further, listing out the more specific canons of
construction that had been used at one time or another by international courts and tribunals when
interpreting treaties. Although the Commission was aware of such usage, it followed Waldock’s
view that such “principles and maxims” were not obligatory in character, but rather simply
served as guides for the interpreter, ones that might be relevant in a given situation.36 The
Commission’s commentary stated that such canons of construction
are, for the most part, principles of logic and good sense valuable only as guides to assist
in appreciating the meaning which the parties have intended to attach to the expressions
that they employed in a document. Their suitability for use in any given case hinges on a
variety of considerations which have first to be appreciated by the interpreter of the
document; the particular arrangement of the words and sentences, their relation to each
other and to other parts of the document, the general nature and subject-matter of the
document, the circumstances in which it was drawn up, etc. Even when a possible
occasion for their application may appear to exist, their application is not automatic but
depends on the conviction of the interpreter that is appropriate in the particular
circumstances to the case. In other words, recourse to many of these principles is
discretionary rather than obligatory and the interpretation of documents is to some extent
an art, not an exact science.
Any attempt to codify the conditions of the application of those principles of
interpretation who appropriateness in any given case depends on the particular context
and on a subjective appreciation of varying circumstances would clearly be inadvisable.
Accordingly, the Commission confined itself to trying to isolate and codify the
comparatively few general principles which appear to constitute general rules for the
interpretation of treaties.37
At the same time, the ILC left open the door for the use of other canons of construction as
supplementary means of interpretation, falling within the broad terms of Vienna Convention
Article 32.38
Thus, like Llewellyn, the ILC viewed the more detailed canons of construction as having
value as a “guide” to treaty interpretation, but believed they had to be applied in context, and
they were not obligatory in nature. Unlike Llewellyn, the ILC did not highlight the ability to play
canons of construction off one another, nor did it suggest that their indeterminacy allowed
35

Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, commentary to Articles 27-28, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 187, 219-20,
para. (8) (“All the various elements, as they were present in any given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and
their interaction would give the legally relevant interpretation.”).
36
Richard Gardiner, The Vienna Convention Rules on Treaty Interpretation, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES
475, 477 (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012) (“It is clear that the ILC’s approach was not to exclude such principles and
maxims, but to concentrate on the minimum necessary to stand as rules.”).
37
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, supra note 35, at 218, paras. (4)-(5).
38
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 220-21 (3d ed. 2013).
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international judges to dress their decision-making in purportedly neutral clothes, thereby
masking the true reasons for reaching a particular outcome. Even so, the possibility of competing
canons being invoked has arisen in international adjudication,39 and academics have certainly
charged that the use of canons provides judges a largely unconstrained ability to decide cases in
accordance with their own preferences.40
IV.

Utility and Limits: Modern Legal Textualism and Pragmatism

Arguably international litigators and judges rely on canons of construction to a much
lesser degree than they might because of the concern that motivated Llewellyn’s analysis and
that prompted the ILC to refrain from explicitly incorporating such canons into what became the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Given that canons of construction, if presented as a
legal “rule” that dictates the outcome in a case, are susceptible to criticism of the type leveled by
Llewellyn, then maybe caution is being exercised with respect to their use. If an empirical study
were undertaken regarding the use of such canons in the judgments of international courts and
tribunals, it would likely find that canons of construction are used, but not in a habitual,
systematic manner, and are certainly far less used than the rules expressly articulated in Articles
31-32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Yet canons of construction are invoked at times by international litigators and judges, as
demonstrated in the other chapters of this volume, and it is worth considering why that is the
case. Here, too, perhaps recent developments in American jurisprudence provide some insights
for the international realm. As recounted by John Manning, by the mid-1980s in the United
States, heavy reliance on legislative history (rather than on canons of construction) for
interpreting an ambiguous statute came under strong attack, both in scholarly circles and in the
courts.41
“Modern legal textualists”, such as the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia,42
reject the ability of judges to ascertain the “actual” intent or purpose of the legislature by
analyzing legislative history, finding such history far too complex, conflicting, and incomplete.
Indeed, modern textualists generally doubt the existence of such a collective legislative intent,
doubt that legislators necessarily agree with the contents of legislative history, and doubt that
purposes expressed at a general level in such history can really govern the specific rules actually
enacted into law.43 Instead, modern textualists believe that the text of a statute is best interpreted
through an understanding of the prevailing interpretive conventions or usages of the community
39

For example, in the Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174, the majority used the intentions of the drafting parties of the United Nation’s Charter to create
an implied power of the United Nations to present a claim on behalf of the victim, while Judge Hackworth argued
that implied powers had to be grounded in the text of an instrument when he emphasized that “[p]owers not
expressed cannot be freely implied.”.
40
For an argument to that effect, see Vitalius Tumonis, Judicial Creativity and Constraint of Legal Rules: Dueling
Canons of International Law, 20 UNIV. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 93, 119 (2012).
41
Manning, supra note 17, at 289.
42
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 26 (1997) (finding that many canons of construction
are “so commonsensical that, were [they] not couched in Latin, you would find it hard to believe that anyone could
criticize them”). For an account of the movement (and its possible overreach), see Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and
Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006).
43
Manning, supra note 17, at 290.
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within which legislators and judges operate, which can lead one to an “objectified” intent.44 That,
in turn, calls for reliance on canons of construction, for “textualists deem it essential to foster
clear and predicable linguistic and syntactic rules to permit legislators and interpreters to decode
enacted texts.”45
Using canons of construction when interpreting treaties may be attractive for similar
reasons. While the Vienna Convention contemplates using the “legislative history” of the treaty –
i.e., the preparatory work of the treaty or travaux préparatoires – the difficulty in doing so,
especially for multilateral treaties that entailed a constellation of States and their officials
engaged in years of sometimes complex negotiations, is well known. Further, if the views
“legislators” – i.e., States and sometimes international organizations – present at the time the
treaty was negotiated are different from the parties to the treaty at a later time, due to new
accessions to the treaty, then it becomes necessary to assume that the acceding party is familiar
with and consents to the travaux préparatoires. Rather than rely on such information for
clarifying the meaning of an ambiguous provision of a treaty, perhaps canons of construction are
an attractive means of gleaning what States likely meant in crafting and agreeing to a treaty
provision, on an assumption that the canons are well-known and understood within the
international legal community.
“Modern legal pragmatism” in the United States46 also has fostered a turn to the use of
canons of construction. While pragmatists such as Professor Cass Sunstein47 share with
textualists a skepticism of legislative history, they reject an effort to ascertain an “objectified”
intent of the legislators to resolve ambiguity. Rather, in the face of an ambiguous statute, the
legal pragmatist turns to canons of construction as default rules that promote certain goals of the
legal system,48 such as the protection of federalism or the interests of disadvantaged groups.49
Likewise, perhaps canons of construction when interpreting treaties are attractive if they assist in
establishing default rules that promote goals of the international legal system. Certainly, a canon
such as in dubio mitius seems designed to help remind the interpreter that, where there is doubt
about the existence of a treaty obligation, a reason not to find the obligation is the desire to
respect the sovereignty of States, a structural feature of the system of international law.
Yet Llewelyn’s basic criticism remains; there is a problem with using canons of
interpretation – either as a set of linguistic and syntactic rules common to international
“legislators” or as default rules to be applied in support of the goals of the international legal
system – if those canons are indeterminate and susceptible to being used to argue conflicting
positions. The path now being taken in American jurisprudence is to develop theories for making
canons of construction more consistent, useful, and legitimate, such as identifying when it is that
a judge will invoke a canon at all,50 and indicating under what circumstances a particular canon
44

Id. at 291.
Id. at 292.
46
See, e.g., M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. PITT. L.
REV. 373 (1985); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179 (1990).
47
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
48
Manning, supra note 17, at 290.
49
See Sunstein, supra note X, at 468-93.
50
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45
VAND. L. REV. 647, 648-56 (1992).
45
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should or should not be used.51 In due course, perhaps a similar path will be taken in
international legal scholarship on the interpretation of treaties, drawing upon the lessons learned
from national jurisprudence52 as well as cross-disciplinary studies.53
V.

Conclusions about the Utility and Limits of Canons of Construction

What conclusions might be drawn from the points discussed above? As a general matter,
there are certain obligatory canons of construction that have been expressly incorporated in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. These canons are essential
elements of the interpretive process; while in any given context, one or the other of these
elements might be favored, they are all to be “thrown into the crucible”54 in order to arrive at a
proper interpretation.
By contrast, other canons of construction, of the type focused upon in this volume, are
regarded as less essential to the interpretive process, and hence of more limited value. They
certainly should not be approached as providing a mechanical or decisive means for resolving
cases, given the likely ability to pair any given canon with another canon that calls for a different
outcome. Indeed, the invocation of a canon as requiring a particular outcome may be an attempt
to mask with legal jargon the interpreter’s own policy preference. Even when invoked simply as
an interpretive aide, such canons must be used with caution, taking full account of the context at
issue. Over time, perhaps there will develop within international law a better understanding (if
not theory) for when it is that such canons should be employed, making their use more consistent
and legitimate.
In the meantime, such canons have been found useful in international discourse, and
hence are referred to and relied upon. A canon might provide assistance to an interpreter as a
non-obligatory guide for how best to approach analyzing certain elements of Vienna Convention
Article 31, such as the context of a treaty provision.55 If application of the elements of Article 31
have led to an interpretive outcome that is problematic, a canon might provide an alternative path
of reasoning, of the kind envisaged in Article 32, perhaps by suggesting a general approach for
harmonizing the diverse system of international law. Indeed, since the canons might be viewed
as expressing an interpretive code understood within the international legal community, a canon
might help in divining what was likely intended by the drafters of the treaty. In any event, at a
minimum, a canon can serve as one tool in the lawyer’s toolkit, providing a simple way of
expressing a complex logical claim, even if susceptible to rebuttal by an opposing logical claim.
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